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Article
Agreeing to Disagree:
The Primacy Debate Between the German Federal
Constitutional Court and the European Court of
Justice
John Henry Dingfelder Stone
I.

INTRODUCTION

From the outside, the stability of the European Union (EU)
and its central place on the European continent is taken for
granted. Encompassing twenty-eight highly stable democracies
bound together by a mutually beneficial economic union and a
shared respect for fundamental rights,1 the EU is rarely
considered anything other than a permanent fixture on the
international scene. To American legal scholars unfamiliar with
its particular workings, the EU may even bear some superficial
resemblance to a European version of the American system of
federal government. The Union plays the part of the American
federal government, complete with legal supremacy over any
contravening domestic Member-State laws. According to
jurisprudence from the European Court of Justice (ECJ), there
is some validity to this conception: both primary sources of
regulation (such as EU treaties) and secondary sources (EU
legislation) trump any contravening national laws or domestic
constitutional provisions.2

Professor of Law, Rhine-Waal University of Applied Sciences, Kleve
(Germany). B.A., J.D., University of Texas. LL.M., University of Nottingham.
The author would like to thank Dr. Kathrin Scherr and Dr. Johann-Christoph
Woltag, as well as his former colleagues at the Max Planck Foundation for
International Peace and the Rule of Law, for their insightful comments and
criticisms. Naturally, any and all errors are the author's responsibility alone.
1. See generally How The EU Works, EUR. UNION, http://europa.eu/abouteu/index_en.htm (last visited Feb. 12, 2015).
2. See Dieter Grimm, The European Court of Justice and National Courts:
The German Constitutional Perspective After the Maastricht Decision, 3 COLUM.
J. EUR. L. 229, 229–30 (1997); René Barents, The Precedence of EU Law from
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However, the Member States that comprise the EU have
historically been quite uninterested in peacefully assuming the
role of subordinate federal states in a larger pan-European
governmental system. This can be seen not only in the very
public rejection by certain Member States of the European
Union’s proffered ‘Constitutional Treaty,’ which leaned overtly
in that direction,3 but also in other far less public, though still
important, actions taken by the Member States to limit the
primacy of the EU.4 Such actions not only dispel the myth that
the EU has taken on the characteristics of a federal nation-state,
but also directly contravene the deeply rooted and generally
accepted legal rule that EU norms trump their domestic
counterparts. It is no exaggeration to declare that the denial of
EU primacy calls into question not only the long-term stability
of the EU, but the very legal basis for the entire Union itself.5
Germany, in particular, has charged rather stridently down this
path in the past few decades, developing a relatively complicated
legal relationship with the EU wherein its Federal
Constitutional Court, the Bundesverfassungsgericht (BVG), has
rejected certain aspects of EU supremacy and asserted instead
the primacy of the German Basic Law (i.e., the German

the Perspective of Constitutional Pluralism, 5 EUR. CONST. L. REV. 421, 424
(2010); Andreas Voßkuhle, Multilevel Cooperation of the European
Constitutional Courts: Der Europäische Verfassungsgerichtsverbund, 6 EUR.
CONST. L. REV. 175, 190 (2010).
3. See, e.g., Dutch Say ‘Devastating No’ to EU Constitution, GUARDIAN
(June 2, 2005), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2005/jun/02/eu.politics
(referring to the Netherlands); Elaine Sciolino, French Voters Soundly Reject
European Union Constitution, N.Y. TIMES (May 30, 2005), http://www.
nytimes.com/2005/05/30/international/europe/30france.html?pagewanted=all&
_r=0 (referring to France).
4. See Mattias Kumm, The Jurisprudence of Constitutional Conflict:
Constitutional Supremacy in Europe Before and After the Constitutional Treaty,
11 EUR. L.J. 262, 263 (2005) (“[I]t would be a mistake to conclude that all
Member States have accepted the Court of Justice’s view that EU Law is the
supreme law of the land. A significant number of national courts have instead
held that they could set aside EU [l]aw on constitutional grounds under certain
circumstances.”); see also Christina Eckes, Protecting Supremacy from External
Influences: A Precondition for a European Legal Order, 18 EUR. L.J. 230, 234
(2012) (“As is well-known national (constitutional) courts have not easily
accepted the supremacy of European law within their national legal orders.”).
5. See Case 6/64, Costa v. ENEL, 1964 E.C.R. 586, 594 (“It follows from all
these observations that the law stemming from the Treaty, an independent
source of law, could not, because of its special and original nature, be overridden
by domestic legal provisions, however framed, without being deprived of its
character as Community law and without the legal basis of the Community
itself being called into question.”).
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Constitution).6 The ideological origins of this development and
its consequences for the future of the EU are equal parts
unsettling and fascinating.
The purpose of this Article is to assess the legal relationship
that currently exists between the EU and Germany with respect
to the primacy of their respective legal regimes. To do so, Part II
will briefly examine the legal doctrine of supremacy as
envisioned by the ECJ. Part III will then trace the development
of the BVG’s case law with respect to the EU’s claim to
supremacy. In this context, the relevant landmark decisions of
the BVG will be highlighted and discussed. Parts IV–V will then
analyze the current state of this relationship and potential
future implications.
II. THE EUROPEAN VISION OF UNION SUPREMACY
As mentioned supra, the EU considers its framework of
legislation and directives to have primacy over contravening
domestic norms. Although the doctrine of primacy has been
somewhat implicit in earlier ECJ decisions, its overt formulation
originated in Costa v. ENEL, wherein the ECJ held that in any
conflict between national and EU legal norms, EU laws were to
be considered supreme.7 This doctrine was later extended in
1970 by the ECJ in Internationale Handelsgesellschaft to include
the supremacy of European laws over national constitutions as
well8:
[T]he validity of such measures can only be judged in the
light of Community law. In fact, the law stemming from
the Treaty, an independent source of law, cannot because
of its very nature be overridden by rules of national law,
however framed, without being deprived of its character
as Community law and without the legal basis of the
Community itself being called in question. Therefore the
validity of a Community measure or its effect within a

6. See, e.g., id.
7. Id.; see also Franz C. Mayer, Supremacy–Lost?—Comment on Roman
Kwiecień, 6 GER. L.J. 1497, 1498 (2005); Dieter Grimm, Defending Sovereign
Statehood Against Transforming the Union into a State, 5 EUR. CONST. L. REV.
353, 355 (2009); Meinhard Hilf, Costa v. ENEL Case, in 2 MAX PLANCK
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 824, 824–25 (Rüdiger Wolfrum
ed., 2013).
8. See Mayer, supra note 7, at 1498; see Grimm, supra note 2, at 230.
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Member State cannot be affected by allegations that it
runs counter to either fundamental rights as formulated
by the constitution of that State or the principles of a
national constitutional structure.9

Thus, from the perspective of the EU, any and all national
legal norms must yield to their EU counterparts. The scope of
this primacy is, therefore, “complete and unconditional.”10 The
practical outcome of such an approach is that, where EU law and
national norms collide, the national norm must be set aside and
the EU law applied “in its entirety.”11 This does not, however,
mean that the conflicting domestic provision is held to be null
and void; rather it is simply not applied where it conflicts with
an EU norm.12
There are a number of logical reasons for imbuing EU norms
with supremacy. First, the unconditional nature of the treaty
obligations assumed by Member States in creating the EU is
such that these obligations cannot be overturned by later,
unilateral domestic acts.13 Second, allowing national laws to
trump EU norms would create a legal landscape wherein the
enforcement and application of EU norms differ from Member
State to Member State.14 Such a variance would directly
undercut the uniformity of legal standards that EU legislation
is intended to bring about.15 Finally, the effectiveness of EU
norms would be fatally undermined if such variability of
enforcement existed.16 From the standpoint of the ECJ, denying
EU law supremacy over domestic norms would call into question
the very legal basis of the EU itself.17
Given the necessity of the uniform application of EU norms
throughout the Member States, it is perhaps unsurprising that
9. Case 11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft v. Einfuhr, 1970 E.C.R.
1125, 1134 (alteration in original).
10. Barents, supra note 2, at 424.
11. Case 106/77, Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. Simmenthal,
1978 E.C.R. 629, 644.
12. See Barents, supra note 2, at 425.
13. See Hilf, supra note 7, at 824–25.
14. See Costa, 1964 E.C.R. at 594.
15. See Mayer, supra note 7, at 1502; Barents, supra note 2, at 424; Gunnar
Beck, The Lisbon Judgment of the German Constitutional Court, the Primacy of
EU Law and the Problem of Kompetenz-Kompetenz: A Conflict Between Right
and Right in Which There Is No Praetor, 17 EUR. L.J. 470, 472 (2011).
16. See Eckes, supra note 4, at 231; Barents, supra note 2, at 424; Mayer,
supra note 7, at 1502.
17. See Costa, 1964 E.C.R. at 594.
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ensuring the uniform interpretation of EU law has also been
considered of great importance by the ECJ. With this goal in
mind, the ECJ has asserted itself as the sole authoritative
interpreter of EU treaties and the competences of the EU
generally.18 This is not to say that national courts do not
interpret EU law; in fact, they are considered the “natural
forum” for EU law, at least for most cases involving private
individuals, and they generally interpret and apply EU law more
than the designated EU courts do.19 In exercising this role,
national courts must not only set aside domestic laws that are
incompatible with their EU counterparts, but must also
interpret their own laws, where possible, such that they are
compatible with EU law.20 However, while national courts have
the power to interpret and apply EU law, their jurisdiction stops
short of allowing them to opine on the actual validity of any
specific EU law.21 Since the ECJ is the sole interpretive
authority with respect to EU treaties, it is also the only legal
body that may declare that an EU law or act is not in compliance
with those treaties.22 The natural consequence of this doctrine is
that “national courts have no jurisdiction themselves to declare
that acts of Community institutions are invalid.”23
Grounds exist whereupon EU law might very well be invalid
in a manner that is of some importance to the Member States.
The EU is limited by the principle of conferral, whereby its
competences are restricted to what the Member States have
agreed upon in the applicable founding treaties.24 All other
competences are left to, and exercisable by, the Member States.25

18. See Beck, supra note 15, at 472–473; see also Grimm, supra note 2, at
236.
19. See MONICA CLAES, THE NATIONAL COURTS’ MANDATE IN THE
EUROPEAN CONSTITUTION 58–59 (2006).
20. Id. at 67.
21. See Case 314/85, Foto-Frost v. Hauptzollamt Lübeck-Ost, 1987 E.C.R.
4225, 4231–32.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 4232 (emphasis added); see also Franz C. Mayer, Rebels Without
a Cause? A Critical Analysis of the German Constitutional Court’s OMT
Reference, 15 GER. L.J. 115 (2014) (stating that national courts have no right to
invalidate or declare EU law inapplicable); Jürgen Bast, Don’t Act Beyond Your
Powers: The Perils and Pitfalls of the German Constitutional Court’s Ultra Vires
Review, 15 GER. L.J. 171 (2014) (arguing that the ECJ has reserved the sole
right to annul or declare an EU law invalid).
24. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union art. 5, Dec. 13,
2007, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 18 [hereinafter Consolidated EU Treaty].
25. Id.
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Thus, while EU law is acknowledged as supreme over national
norms, “its supremacy extends no further than the scope of the
powers that Member States have chosen to confer on the
Union.”26 Acting beyond its conferred powers would render the
resulting EU law invalid, yet only an EU organ in the form of
the ECJ, is allowed to make this determination. As such, the
ECJ claims the sole authority (known as Kompetenz-Kompetenz)
to determine the outer limits of the conferred competences of the
EU, even though these specific limitations were established by
the Member States.27
Another area where EU laws might be considered invalid
involves the limitations set out in national constitutions. Since
the EU may only exercise those powers voluntarily granted to it
by Member States, it is not only limited to those powers which
the Member States actually confer, but also to those powers
which the Member States may legally confer in accordance with
their national constitutions. This is a distinction of some
importance, since most national constitutions limit the extent to
which the Member States may transfer domestic powers to
international entities.28 One example of this is “national
identity,” the relinquishment of which is generally prohibited in
national constitutions.29 Given this limitation, any EU law that
infringes upon the national identity of such a nation would
arguably be outside the conferred competences of the EU, as the
domestic government would not have had the power under their
own constitutional system to confer such a derogation of identity
in the first place. In this manner, because the legitimacy of the
EU relies on the conferral of powers pursuant to the limitations
of national constitutions, the ultimate validity of EU laws (as
well as any claim to supremacy) is therefore limited by these
constitutions as well.30 However, since national courts may not
26. Beck, supra note 15, at 472.
27. See id.
28. See Grimm, supra note 2, at 230.
29. See id. Although generally acknowledged as impossible to define, this
term presumably refers to certain basic political and constitutional structures
or powers underlying sovereignty.
30. See Voßkuhle, supra note 2, at 191; Michelle Iodice, Solange in Athens,
32 B.U. INT’L L.J. 539, 541 (2014); Erich Vranes, German Constitutional
Foundations of, and Limitations to, EU Integration: A Systematic Analysis, 14
GER. L.J. 75, 109 (2013); Niels Petersen, Karlsruhe Not Only Barks, But Finally
Bites—Some Remarks on the OMT Decision of the German Constitutional Court,
15 GER. L.J. 321, 322 (2014). However, it must be noted that this invalidity
would arguably only occur from the perspective of the national courts enforcing
domestic law; from the perspective of international law, such disputed treaty
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declare EU laws invalid, the actual interpretation and
application of any national limitations on EU competence is still
left to the ECJ.
The end result is that the EU not only considers its laws to
be supreme to both the laws and constitutions of the Member
States, but also denies the national court systems of the Member
States any jurisdictional ability to even consider the validity of
the very EU laws that reign supreme over that legal system. In
other words, the national courts may very well find themselves
required to override a legitimate domestic legal norm (or
constitutional requirement) in favor of an EU law that they
deem to be illegitimate. As may well be imagined, not every
national jurisdiction is entirely supportive of this outcome.
III. THE GERMAN VISION OF UNION SUPREMACY
One jurisdiction that has been especially critical of the
continued development of the EU’s supremacy doctrine as well
as its claim of Kompetenz-Kompetenz is Germany. It is well
known that the BVG “has never fully accepted the absolute
supremacy of the ECJ in matters of EU law.”31 This reticence to
adhere to the EU’s development of its own comprehensive
supremacy over national constitutions can be clearly seen and
best understood in the case law of the BVG.
A. THE SOLANGE CASES AND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS REVIEW
The initial case in which the BVG questioned the primacy of
EU law is Solange I: in that case, the BVG was presented with
the question of whether an EU law that infringed on

provisions remain valid and binding upon the Member State unless it was
“objectively evident to any State” involved in the process that the Member State
lacked the domestic power to agree to that treaty and the internal limitation
was of “fundamental importance.” Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,
art. 46, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
31. Petersen, supra note 30, at 321; Mayer, supra note 23, at 116; Daniel
Thym, In the Name of Sovereign Statehood: A Critical Introduction to the Lisbon
Judgment of the German Constitutional Court, 46 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1795,
1795 (2009); Matthias Niedobitek, The Lisbon Case of 30 June 2009—A
Comment from the European Law Perspective, 10 GER. L.J. 1267, 1273 (2009).
See also Andreas Voßkuhle, Multilevel Cooperation of the European
Constitutional Courts, 6 EUR. CONST. L. REV. 175, 195–96 (2010) (noting that
“the primacy of Union law . . . is neither absolute nor based on Union law, but
anchored in national constitutional law, and therefore also limited by it.”).
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fundamental rights enshrined in the German Basic Law
(Constitution) did indeed have supremacy over those
fundamental rights.32 Given that such an EU law, if supreme,
would be applied in place of the national fundamental rights,
such a result would leave individuals at the complete mercy of
the EU legal system for rights protection. The BVG stated that
since fundamental rights were an inalienable part of the Basic
Law, the competence to displace or weaken them could not
legally be transferred to the EU as part of the conferral of
powers.33 In this sense, the protection of fundamental rights was
part of the national identity of Germany and could not be
“surrendered by any legal act.”34 As such, any EU law that
infringed upon fundamental rights would not be valid, and
where a conflict occurred between German fundamental rights
and an EU law, the German rights would prevail.35 This was
especially the case considering that the BVG determined the
protection afforded to fundamental rights at the EU level to be
inadequate.36 The BVG concluded that “so long as” (“solange” in
German) this inadequate level of protection remained, it would
exercise its jurisdiction to review EU acts for compatibility with
the fundamental rights set out in the German Basic Law.37 The
BVG noted, however, that it would only exercise its jurisdiction
over an issue where the ECJ had already been asked to interpret
the EU act in question and the resulting interpretation did not
32. See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVERFG] [Federal Constitutional
Court] May 29, 1974, 37 BVERFGE 271 (Ger.) [hereinafter Solange I].
33. See Solange I, 37 BVERFGE 271 (280) (Ger.) (“Ein unaufgebbares, zur
Verfassungsstruktur des Grundgesetzes gehörendes Essentiale der geltenden
Verfassung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland ist der Grundrechtsteil des
Grundgesetzes. Ihn zu relativieren, gestattet Art. 24 GG nicht vorbehaltlos.”).
34. Grimm, supra note 7, at 356–57.
35. See Solange I, 37 BVERFGE 271 (281) (Ger.) (“Vorläufig entsteht also in
dem unterstellten Fall einer Kollision von Gemeinschaftsrecht mit einem Teil
des nationalen Verfassungsrechts, näherhin der grundgesetzlichen
Grundrechtsgarantien, die Frage, welches Recht vorgeht, das andere also
verdrängt. In diesem Normenkonflikt setzt sich die Grundrechtsgarantie des
Grundgesetzes durch, solange nicht entsprechend dem Vertragsmechanismus
die zuständigen Organe der Gemeinschaft den Normenkonflikt behoben
haben.”).
36. See id., at 280; Anne Peters, The Bananas Decision (2000) of the
German Federal Constitutional Court: Towards Reconciliation with the
European Court of Justice as Regards Fundamental Rights Protection in
Europe, 43 GER. Y.B. INT’L L. 276, 278 (2000).
37. See Solange I, 37 BVERFGE 271 (285) (Ger.); see also Grimm, supra note
7, at 356–57; Ming-Sung Kuo, Discovering Sovereignty in Dialogue: Is Judicial
Dialogue the Answer to Constitutional Conflict in the Pluralist Legal
Landscape?, 26 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 341, 362 (2013).
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relieve any conflict between the EU norm and German
fundamental rights.38
The ramifications of this decision are not only fairly clear,
but also rather immense. First, by holding that an EU law would
not be supreme to a national constitutional provision (however
important its standing within the domestic legal system), the
BVG was directly challenging the doctrine of EU supremacy as
developed by the ECJ. Second, by inserting itself as a legal
authority capable of reviewing the compatibility of an EU law
with a national provision, and potentially holding that EU norm
to be inapplicable within the national system, the BVG was
explicitly ignoring the ECJ’s ruling that it had the sole authority
to declare an EU law invalid. These independent assertions
arose from the basic fact that the BVG viewed the relationship
between the Member States and the EU in a fundamentally
different light than the ECJ did, as later cases will show.
Although there was considerable unease about the BVG’s
decision, the ECJ proved particularly receptive to the criticism
that fundamental rights protection was lacking at the EU level
and set about remedying this deficit.39 Taking inspiration from
various international instruments, as well as from the “joint
constitutional heritage of Member States,” the ECJ
“substantially accelerated the development of its common-law
type fundamental rights jurisprudence.”40 The end-result of the
developmental process was that the EU treaties implicitly
contained an “unwritten Bill of Rights” to which EU laws and
actions were required to adhere.41 In this manner, the ECJ was
able to reinforce the continuing supremacy of EU law over
conflicting national norms,42 since the increased protection of
fundamental rights never allowed Germany (or any other
Member State) to entertain a case wherein an EU law was
inconsistent with the protection of fundamental rights.
Thus, by developing its fundamental rights jurisprudence,
the ECJ avoided any potential conflict with the BVG.43 As a
result of this development, it was never necessary for the BVG

38. See Solange I, 37 BVERFGE 271 (285); see also Grimm, supra note 7, at
357.
39. See Grimm, supra note 2, at 233; Kuo, supra note 37, at 363.
40. Kumm, supra note 4, at 294–95; see also Grimm, supra note 2, at 233;
Beck, supra note 15, at 489.
41. Grimm, supra note 2, at 233.
42. See id.
43. See Beck, supra note 15, at 489.
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to assert the jurisdiction to review EU laws that it had claimed
in Solange I. In 1986, the BVG officially put an end to any
speculation that it eventually would: in what became known as
Solange II, the BVG examined the ECJ’s increased protection of
fundamental rights, and declared that they were now
sufficiently guaranteed at the EU level.44 The Court further
stated that “so long as” the EU continued to adequately protect
fundamental rights, then the BVG would no longer exercise its
jurisdiction to review EU legislation or acts.45 Notably, the BVG
specifically asserted that the protections afforded at the EU level
need not be identical in every respect to those guaranteed at the
national level, as long as they were generally considered to be
equivalent.46 In doing so, the BVG took away any obligation on
its part to compare and contrast between the various doctrines
of fundamental rights protections at each level, effectively
eliminating any possible necessity to provide exhaustive
oversight of EU law.
Although the BVG in Solange II established a legal standard
that it would essentially no longer review EU acts or legislation,
it is important to realize that the Court did not expressly
relinquish its claim that it had the jurisdiction to do so.47 Rather,
it chose not to exercise this jurisdiction only so long as the EU
continued to adequately protect fundamental rights.48 Put
differently, the BVG’s decision maintained the stance that it has
the power to review EU laws for validity given the limitations of
national constitutional requirements and that it could reactivate
this jurisdiction at any time if the EU failed to live up to its end
of the bargain.49 Thus, the assertions made by the BVG in
Solange I that the supremacy of EU law is subject to limitations
imposed by national constitutions, and the BVG’s power to police
these limitations (both contrary to the ECJ’s established
jurisprudence), were implicitly sustained. Actions of the BVG

44. See BVERFG, Oct. 22, 1986, 73 BVERFGE 339 (378), (Ger.) [hereinafter
Solange II] (“Dieser Grundrechtsstandard ist mittlerweise insbesondere durch
die Rechtsprechung des Gerichtshofs der Europäischen Gemeinschaften
inhaltlich ausgestaltet worden, gefestigt und zureichend gewährleistet.”); see
also Voßkuhle, supra note 2, at 192.
45. See Solange II, 73 BVERFGE 339 (381) (Ger.); see also Grimm, supra
note 7, at 357.
46. See Solange II, 73 BVERFGE 339 (381) (Ger.); see also Grimm, supra
note 2, at 230–31.
47. See Voßkuhle, supra note 2, at 192; see also Grimm, supra note 2 at 234.
48. See Voßkuhle, supra note 2, at 192; Grimm, supra note 2, at 234.
49. See Grimm, supra note 2, at 235; Iodice, supra note 30, at 543.
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since Solange II, however, have shown that the reactivation of
its jurisdiction in this area would likely require a “decisive step
backwards” in the protection of fundamental rights at the EU
level.50 Indeed, the standard of proof now required by those
seeking to engage the Court’s jurisdiction in this area is
“unanimously regarded in the academic literature as practically
insurmountable.”51
B. THE MAASTRICHT CASE AND THE INITIATION OF ULTRA VIRES
REVIEW
In 1993, in what has become known as the Maastricht case,
the BVG was confronted with a constitutional challenge to
Germany’s accession to the latest EU Treaty (the Maastricht
Treaty).52 The BVG’s eventual decision found the applicant’s
challenges to the Treaty to be without merit, but in doing so, the
BVG revisited and reinvigorated many of the primacy debates
that had remained dormant since Solange II.53
The initial section of the decision concerns admissibility
standards and, with respect to issues of fundamental rights
review, effectively reaffirms the Solange line of cases—though
with a slight twist.54 In Solange I and Solange II, the BVG
indicated that its jurisdiction to review fundamental rights cases
involved only those situations where the infringing EU law in
question was applied by a German institution.55 On the other
hand, in Maastricht, the BVG clarified that its jurisdiction
extended to any situation where the application of EU law
impacted fundamental rights.56 The practical consequences of
this extension are minimal, since the BVG also reasserted the
same unattainable standard for the activation of its jurisdiction
50. Grimm, supra note 2, at 235.
51. Vranes, supra note 30, at 104; see Voßkuhle, supra note 2, at 192
(opining that it is “unlikely that this admissibility standard may ever be
passed”). It is arguable, however, that the admissibility standard in this area
has been weakened in the recent Data Protection Case, BVERFG, Mar. 2, 2010,
125 BVERFGE 260 (Ger.) [hereinafter Data Protection Case], though the
practical impact of that case remains to be seen.
52. See BVerfG, Oct. 12, 1993, 89 BVERFGE 155 (Ger.) [hereinafter
Maastricht].
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. See Solange I, 37 BVERFGE 271 (Ger.); see also Solange II, 73 BVERFGE
339 (Ger.).
56. See Maastricht, 89 BVERFGE 155 (174) (Ger.); see also Grimm, supra
note 2, at 234.
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in this area.57 In effect, the BVG expanded a jurisdiction that it
had already rendered virtually impossible to invoke. However,
in doing so, the BVG reiterated its theoretical ability to review
EU legislation.
The second, and main, part of the Maastricht decision
focuses on the competences of the EU from the perspective of the
BVG. The basic assumption of the BVG is that the Member
States are the “Masters of the Treaties” in the sense that the
Member States control the EU and not the other way around.58
As such, the validity of EU law in Germany arises from the
national legislative acts that create and govern its application
within the domestic legal system.59 The natural consequence of
this understanding of the relationship between the EU and the
Member States is that EU law may be considered supreme when
it comes into conflict with incompatible domestic norms, but this
supremacy exists only because the national legislation
governing EU law makes it supreme.60 In other words, it is a
supremacy over the domestic laws that is entirely dependent on
those domestic laws. The end effect is that national laws are only
subsidiary on a voluntary basis.
The conception that the EU is a product of the Member
States also results in a fundamental shift as to the definition of
EU competences. As a starting point in Maastricht, the BVG
went to great lengths to disprove the notion that the EU had the
power to decide the limitations of its own competence
(Kompetenz-Kompetenz).61 The restrictions set around the
conferred powers are those established by the Member States,
and the EU does not possess an exclusive position when it comes
to their definition. Taking this line of reasoning a step further,
the BVG stated that it, as a national domestic court, also had the
power to review EU competences.62 From the BVG’s point of
view, since the EU is limited to only those powers specifically
conferred upon it, any EU actions beyond those powers would

57. See Grimm, supra note 2, at 234–35.
58. Maastricht, 89 BVERFGE 155 (190) (Ger.) (“Deutschland ist einer der
‘Herren der Verträge.’”); see also Julio Baquero Cruz, The Legacy of the
Maastricht-Urteil and the Pluralist Movement, 14 EUR. L.J. 389, 392 (2008).
59. See Maastricht, 89 BVERFGE 155 (190) (Ger.).
60. See id.; Grimm, supra note 7, at 355.
61. See Maastricht, 89 BVERFGE 155 (195–97) (Ger.).
62. See id. at 188 (“Dementsprechend prüft das Bundesverfassungsgericht,
ob Rechtsakte der europäischen Einrichtungen und Organe sich in den Grenzen
der ihnen eingeräumten Hoheitsrechte halten oder aus ihnen ausbrechen.”).
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not be binding within Germany.63 This is true not only of EU
laws or other secondary legislation, but also where judicial
interpretation of the EU Treaty effectively expands the Treaty
outside the limitations specifically imposed by the Member
States.64 Thus, in Maastricht, the BVG not only asserted that
EU power is limited by the national constitutions and the
conferred powers within the EU Treaty, but also that the
Member States have the right to police and invalidate any ultra
vires acts taken by the EU.65 Naturally, these doctrines fly
directly in the face of established EU jurisprudence.66
The Maastricht decision was not well received by academics
or practitioners.67 However, similar to the aftermath of Solange
I, the reaction at the EU level appeared fairly mute. Rather than
directly combatting the challenge to its jurisdiction, the ECJ
instead “began to act much more cautiously in cases related to
Community powers.”68 By tightening its case law with respect to
EU competences, and limiting the liberalness of its interpretive
doctrines, the ECJ, in effect, began to self-police EU actions.
Similar to its response to Solange I, the ECJ’s actions postMaastricht effectively reduced the opportunities for conflict
between itself and the BVG, rather than seek them out.69 It
should be noted, though, that numerous scholars argue that the
ECJ’s actions were not taken in response to the BVG, but rather
were arrived at independently.70 Although the validity of the
cause and effect in this instance can never be authoritatively
established, at a minimum, the timing of the ECJ’s shifting
jurisprudence is suspicious.

63. See id.
64. See id. at 157; Cruz, supra note 58, at 392.
65. See Bast, supra note 23, at 170; Elisabetta Lanza, Core of State
Sovereignty and Boundaries of European Union’s Identity in the LissabonUrteil, 11 GER. L.J. 399, 411 (2010); Voßkuhle, supra note 2, at 193; Franz C.
Mayer, The European Constitution and the Courts: Adjudicating European
Constitutional Law in a Multilevel System 13 (Monnet Working Paper No. 9/03,
2003), http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/ archive/papers/03/030901-03.pdf.
66. See Beck, supra note 15, at 472.
67. See JHR & LB, On the Lissabon-Urteil: Democracy and a Democratic
Paradox, 5 EUR. CONST. L. REV. 341, 344 (2009); Grimm, supra note 2, at 237.
68. Cruz, supra note 58, at 404; accord Kumm, supra note 4, at 296;
Voßkuhle, supra note 2, at 195.
69. See Cruz, supra note 58, at 404.
70. Id.
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C. THE LISBON DECISION AND IDENTITY REVIEW
For its part, post-Maastricht, the BVG also appeared to be
in no hurry to provoke an incident with the ECJ. Having sent a
“clear message” to the ECJ and the EU institutions generally,71
the BVG failed to follow through with its threat to invalidate EU
legislation in any of its subsequent cases.72 In this respect, the
Court actively avoided direct and open conflict with the ECJ over
these issues. Some commentators believed the BVG became “all
bark and no bite.”73 As such, the aggressive expansion of the
Lisbon decision of 2009 came as somewhat of a surprise to
many.74
In Lisbon, the BVG upheld the constitutional compatibility
of the new Lisbon EU Treaty with the German Basic Law, while
striking down the domestic implementation of that Treaty.75
Though, similar to Maastricht, it was not so much the ultimate
outcome of the constitutional challenge that proved especially
important, rather it was the language and reasoning the BVG
applied in doing so. The BVG’s discussion of the Treaty in
relation to the limitations of Germany’s Basic Law proved highly
significant in several specific aspects surrounding Germany’s
legal relationship with the EU.76
First, the BVG reiterated and clarified many of its positions
from Maastricht. Specifically, Lisbon reaffirmed that the
Member States remained the “Masters of the Treaties” and the
ultimate source of the EU’s power.77 As such, any primacy of EU
law over domestic law is derived from the Basic Law rather than
the autonomous supremacy of the Treaty.78 Furthermore, the
EU may only act within those powers that have been conferred
71. Id.
72. See Beck, supra note 15, at 486; Cruz, supra note 58, at 395–96; Frank
Schorkopf, The European Union as an Association of Sovereign States:
Karlsruhe’s Ruling on the Treaty of Lisbon, 10 GER. L.J. 1219 (2009).
73. Cruz, supra note 58, at 395; see, e.g., Christoph U. Schmid, All Bark
and No Bite: Notes on the Federal Constitutional Court’s “Banana Decision,” 7
EUR. L.J. 95 (2001).
74. See Schorkopf, supra note 72, at 1219.
75. See Frank Schorkopf, German Federal Constitutional Court Opinion on
the Compatibility of the EU Lisbon Treaty with the German Basic Law, 104 AM.
J. INT’L L. 259 (2010) [hereinafter Schorkopf Lisbon].
76. See id. at 260.
77. See BVERFG, Jun. 30, 2009, 123 BVERFGE 267, § 231 (Ger.) [hereinafter
Lisbon]; see also Roland Bieber, An Association of Sovereign States, 5 EUR.
CONST. L. REV. 391, 397 (2009).
78. See 123 BVERFGE 267 (§ 240) (Ger.).
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upon it, and the BVG reasserted its jurisdiction to consider
whether EU acts are ultra vires.79 Moreover, the Court expanded
this jurisdiction by clearly stating that, in addition to policing
EU actions for conformity with conferred powers, it would
provide oversight to ensure the EU’s adherence to the principle
of subsidiarity.80 Finally, the BVG reasserted its understanding
that the EU lacks jurisdiction to rule on its own competence
(Kompetenz-Kompetenz).81
However, the BVG did more in Lisbon than simply repeat
and further entrench its prior views on the legal relationship
between the EU and Germany; it expanded them as well. When
discussing the basic limitations imposed upon the Lisbon Treaty
by the German Basic Law, the BVG noted that the German
legislature’s constitutional abilities to transfer sovereign powers
to the EU “are granted under the condition that the sovereign
statehood of a constitutional state is maintained on the basis of
an integration programme according to the principle of conferral
and respecting the Member States’ constitutional identity.”82
Thus, not only is the EU limited to the use of those powers that
have been specifically conferred to it by the Member State, but
it also may not exercise conferred powers that the Member State
was constitutionally unable to transfer.83 In Germany’s case,
this encompasses those aspects of its “non-transferable identity”
that are safeguarded under Article 79(3) German Basic Law.84
The BVG in Lisbon states that this includes decisions as to:
[S]ubstantive and formal criminal law . . . the disposition
of the monopoly on the use of force by the police within
the state and by the military towards the exterior . . .
fundamental fiscal decisions on public revenue and
79. See id.; see also Schorkopf, supra note 72, at 1227–28; Vranes, supra
note 30, at 93; Grimm, supra note 7, at 363; JHR, supra note 67, at 341.
80. See 123 BVERFGE 267 (§ 240) (Ger.); Consolidated EU Treaty, supra
note 22, at 18 (defining the principle of subsidiarity as such that “in areas which
do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Union shall act only if and
insofar as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved
by the Member States, either at the central level or at regional and local level,
but can rather, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better
achieved at Union level.”); see also Schorkopf, supra note 67, at 1231.
81. See 123 BVERFGE 267 (§ 322) (Ger.).
82. Id. § 226.
83. See Vranes, supra note 30, at 93.
84. See 123 BVERFGE 267 (§ 235) (Ger.); Stefan Theil, What Red Lines, If
Any, Do the Lisbon Judgments of European Constitutional Courts Draw for
Future EU Integration?, 15 GER. L.J. 599, 610 (2014).
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public expenditure . . . decisions on the shaping of living
conditions in a social state . . . and decisions of particular
cultural importance.85

The Court goes into great detail in the decision as to the
specific aspects that are off-limits to European integration and
restates that “substantial freedom of action must remain
reserved to the Member States” in these areas.86 In line with its
prior assertion of jurisdiction to provide ultra vires review, the
BVG also asserted in Lisbon the jurisdiction to assess whether
EU actions infringe upon the national constitutional identity of
Germany and invalidate any such actions that do.87
Understandably, Lisbon was not welcomed with immediate
approval.88 This is unsurprising, given the decision was simply
another in a “long line of precedents” that had also previously
been subjected to harsh critique.89 The reaffirmation of the
reasoning in these prior cases, and the expansion into other
areas of review, acted to further entrench the BVG’s long-held
conception of the legal relationship between Germany and the
EU.
However, Lisbon, while relying on the BVG’s prior cases,
shifted the BVG’s emphasis by focusing more on German
sovereignty.90 This shift may be seen quite clearly in the
drastically increased usage of the German root word “souverän”
(forty-nine times) in the judgment as compared to prior usage in
Maastricht (eight times) and the Solange cases (zero times).91
Far from a simple linguistic change, the alteration in focus to
Member State sovereignty made the decision less about the
limitations on the EU as required by the Treaty, and more about
85. 123 BVERFGE 267 (§ 252) (Ger.); see also Theil, supra note 84, at 610;
Jo Eric Khushal Murkens, Identity Trumps Integration: The Lisbon Treaty in
the German Federal Constitutional Court, 48 DER STAAT 517, 521 (2009); Thym,
supra note 31, at 1800; Christian Tomuschat, The Ruling of the German
Constitutional Court on the Treaty of Lisbon, 10 GER. L.J. 1259, 1260 (2009).
86. 123 BVERFGE 267 (§ 253) (Ger.); see also (§§ 252–60).
87. See id. § 240.
88. See JHR, supra note 67, at 343; Joseph H. Weiler, The ‘Lisbon Urteil’
and the Fast Food Culture, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 505 (2009); Anna-Bettina Kaiser,
German Federal Constitutional Court: German Data Retention Provisions
Unconstitutional in Their Present Form, 6 EUR. CONST. L. REV. 503, 507 (2010);
Alfred Grosser, The Federal Constitutional Court’s Lisbon Case: Germany’s
“Sonderweg”—An Outsider’s Perspective, 10 GER. L.J. 1263 (2009).
89. Grimm, supra note 7, at 353.
90. See id. at 364.
91. See Murkens, supra note 85, at 520–21.
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the restrictions imposed on the EU by the constitutional orders
of Member States themselves. Thus, whereas Maastricht spoke
of the EU acting beyond its treaty-defined powers (ultra vires),
Lisbon spoke of the EU acting beyond the powers the Members
States could constitutionally confer (identity review).92
In this respect, Lisbon is a throwback to the line of thinking
apparent in Solange I, where even though the term
“souveränität” is not mentioned by name, the fundamental
rights limitation imposed upon the EU by the BVG was an
external restriction arising from an inalienable aspect of
Germany’s constitutional identity.93 In many respects, Lisbon’s
increased focus on protecting Germany’s sovereignty from EU
encroachment was viewed as the BVG setting concrete
limitations on the future integration of the EU.94 From a
practical standpoint, however, these restrictions were viewed
with some skepticism: since the BVG had in prior cases
continuously failed to invoke its jurisdiction over EU affairs,
there was some doubt as to whether it would actually enforce
these limitations in the future either.95
Despite the possible lack of a practical usage, the difficulties
inherent in a limitation of the EU dependent on national identity
are numerous and fairly apparent. For one thing, the concept of
‘identity’ itself is exceedingly difficult to quantify and define: the
Dutch scholar Kossmann has made the analogy to a “big jellyfish
on the beach” which, after careful consideration, should be left
alone, since it is “too complicated, too multifaceted and too
variable.”96 The malleability of this term also leaves it open to
abuse by national courts.97 Indeed, the BVG’s definition as to
what comprises national identity has become rather “elaborate”
and “expansive.”98 Naturally, the more expansive the definition,
92. Grimm, supra note 7, at 365.
93. See id. at 364; 37 BVERFGE 271 (280) (Ger.) (“Ein unaufgebbares, zur
Verfassungsstruktur des Grundgesetzes gehörendes Essentiale der geltenden
Verfassung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland ist der Grundrechtsteil des
Grundgesetzes.”).
94. See Thym, supra note 31, at 1808; JHR, supra note 67, at 342.
95. See Schorkopf, supra note 72, at 1239; Henning Deters, National
Constitutional Jurisprudence in a Post-National Europe: The ESM Ruling of the
German Federal Constitutional Court and the Disavowal of Conflict, 20 EUR.
L.J. 204, 213 (2014).
96. Jan-Herman Reestman, The Franco-German Constitutional Divide, 5
EUR. CONST. L. REV. 374 (2009).
97. See Mayer, supra note 23, at 133.
98. Armin von Bogdandy & Stephan Schill, Overcoming Absolute Primacy:
Respect for National Identity Under the Lisbon Treaty, 48 COMMON MKT. L. REV.
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the more protection national laws and rights are afforded with
respect to EU encroachment. Of course, the resulting protection
also necessarily shields idiosyncratic national laws from
superseding EU regulations, which in turn hinders the
uniformity of the EU legal landscape.
Since a Member State’s national identity is determined by
its domestic legal system, every national system will define its
identity differently based upon its own internal prerogatives,
further undermining consistency in the EU area.99 This is in
stark contrast to ultra vires review, where every national system
would interpret and apply the same articles of the EU Treaty in
a presumably similar manner.100 Thus, identity review yields a
greater risk of legal inconsistencies among the EU Member
States, which, given the importance placed by the ECJ upon the
uniform interpretation and application of EU laws, would likely
provide a fertile ground for conflict between the ECJ and
national courts, specifically the BVG.101
D. THE HONEYWELL CASE AND ULTRA VIRES REVIEW
Any doubt as to whether the BVG would actually invoke its
jurisdiction to examine the validity of an EU act was, in some
respects, both silenced and amplified by the BVG’s Honeywell
case of 2010. In Honeywell, the BVG was presented with its first
real opportunity after Lisbon to review an EU act, and it did so,
albeit tentatively.102 In doing so, the BVG reiterated that it was
“empowered and obliged” to review the validity of EU acts.103 As
such, the BVG invoked its ultra vires jurisdiction and explicitly
clarified the conditions under which it would hold an EU law to
be outside the powers of the EU.104 The end result was that

1417, 1438–39 (2011).
99. See Mayer, supra note 23, at 133; Thym, supra note 31, at 1806.
100. See Thym, supra note 31, at 1806. However, Thym also argues later
that the resulting flexibility of ‘identity’ review provides for the possibility of
country-specific solutions. See id. at 1809.
101. See id. at 1805.
102. See Matthias Mahlmann, The Politics of Constitutional Identity and its
Legal Frame—the Ultra Vires Decision of the German Federal Constitutional
Court, 11 GER. L.J. 1407, 1409 (2010); Theil, supra note 84, at 627.
103. BVERFG, July 6, 2010, 126 BVERFGE 286 (§ 55) (Ger.),
http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocts/Entscheidungen/EN/20
10/07/rs20100706_2bvr266106en.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2015) [hereinafter
Honeywell].
104. See Mahlmann, supra note 102, at 1410.
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under the clarified standard set out by the BVG, the EU action
in Honeywell was not found to be ultra vires.105 Thus, the BVG
silenced some critics by actually invoking its jurisdiction over
EU acts, but emboldened others by not actually following
through with its threats to limit the EU.
The real importance of Honeywell, though, lies in the
standard enunciated by the BVG as to when it would actually
hold an EU act ultra vires. As an initial procedural hurdle, the
BVG stated that the ECJ must have first had the opportunity to
“deliver its legal opinion by means of a preliminary ruling.”106 As
such, the BVG will not invalidate an EU action unless the ECJ
itself has specifically failed to act in that regard.107 From a
substantive standpoint, the BVG clarified that only those EU
acts that are “manifestly” beyond the “transferred competences”
and “highly significant in the structure of competences between
the Member States and the Union with regard to the principle of
conferral and to the binding nature of the statute under the rule
of law” will be considered ultra vires.108 Finally, from a purely
practical standpoint, the ECJ is entitled to a “tolerance of
error,”109 such that isolated cases of error may not give rise to
ultra vires actions.110
The cumulative effect of these standards lends some
credence to the critiques of the BVG, in that, although Honeywell
makes the invocation of the Court’s ultra vires jurisdiction very
possible (as evidenced by its usage in Honeywell itself), given the
deferential language employed by the BVG, the most likely
outcome is that the EU act will be upheld.111 For one thing, the
requirement of a manifest transgression of EU competences that
has purposefully not been remedied by the ECJ when given the
chance is a hurdle of such magnitude that it is likely never to
occur.112 Given that most structural change within the EU
integration process has occurred incrementally or piecemeal, it
105. See Honeywell, 126 BVERFGE 286 (§ 68) (Ger.).
106. Christoph Möllers,
German
Federal Constitutional Court:
Constitutional Ultra Vires Review of European Acts Only Under Exceptional
Circumstances; Decision of 6 July 2010, 2 BvR 2661/06, Honeywell, 7 EUR.
CONST. L. REV. 161, 165 (2011); see Honeywell, 126 BVERFGE 286 (§ 60)(Ger.);
see also Theil, supra note 84, at 626.
107. See Bast, supra note 23, at 170.
108. Honeywell, 126 BVERFGE 286 (§ 61)(Ger.).
109. Id. § 66.
110. See Theil, supra note 84, at 627.
111. See Möllers, supra note 106, at 166.
112. See id.
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is even more unlikely that a major structural shift in the
competences between the Member States and the EU would
even exist, much less be attributable to an actual manifest act
by the EU itself.113 Thus, the Honeywell requirements for a
successful ultra vires appeal appear very similar in their
impracticality to the standards for a fundamental rights appeal
set out in Solange II (a standard that has yet to successfully be
met).114
There are legitimate reasons for the inaccessibility of this
standard, though. First and perhaps foremost, the difficulty in
achieving the criteria reveals the BVG’s unease itself with
national courts actually having the ability to hold EU acts
invalid.115 Therefore, an ultra vires holding should be a rare
measure of last resort and the seeming impossibility of the
Honeywell standard reflects this. In addition, the requirement
that an ultra vires act be manifest makes the determination of
such an act fairly straightforward—an ‘obvious’ transgression of
powers should be easy to identify and uncontroversial.116 This in
turn removes any uncertainty over the ultimate actions of the
BVG, since the invalidation of such a manifest misstep on the
part of the EU would be beyond reproach from most quarters.117
Providing additional deference to the ECJ in its decisions serves
the same purpose.118 Also, only an obvious and highly significant
ultra vires EU act would cause enough damage on its own to
justify the extensive injury to the EU legal system that an ultra
vires holding itself would cause.119 In other words, an ultra vires
holding would likely be a pyrrhic victory, and only justifiable
where the EU was already far along in burning itself to the
ground anyway.

113. See id. at 166–67. This is an idea identified and explored by the
Honeywell dissent, though it is ultimately found unconvincing to the majority.
See Honeywell, 126 BVERFGE 286 (§ 103) (Ger.); see also Mahlmann, supra note
102, at 1413.
114. See Möllers, supra note 106, at 165.
115. See Honeywell, 126 BVERFGE 286 (§ 57) (Ger.) (“If each Member State
claimed to be able to decide through their own courts on the validity of legal
acts of the Union, the primacy of application could be circumvented in practice,
and the uniform application of Union law would be placed at risk.”); see also
Mayer, supra note 23, at 133; Mahlmann, supra note 102, at 1410.
116. See Mahlmann, supra note 102, at 1414.
117. See id.
118. See id. at 1410–11.
119. See id. at 1415.
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E. THE OMT DECISION AND THE CURRENT STATE OF AFFAIRS
That, at least, was the conventional opinion. In its latest
decision from January 2014, however, with respect to the
Outright Monetary Transactions program (litigation that is still
ongoing at the time of this Article), the BVG expressed an
unexpected willingness to potentially set the entire system on
fire.120 In the OMT decision, the BVG was directly confronted
with the rather complicated mechanisms meant to quell the
European financial crisis.121 In an earlier 2012 case, the BVG
had ruled that Germany was allowed to participate in the
European Stability Mechanism (ESM), which provided “loans
and other financial assistance to states in trouble,” only so long
as the German Parliament retained extensive control over ESM
actions.122 Contemporaneous with the 2012 decision, the
European Central Bank (ECB) issued a public statement
pledging to prop up troubled Eurozone States by buying their
bonds on the secondary market; this was known as the Outright
Monetary Transactions program (OMT).123 In essence, the OMT
was meant to serve the same purpose as the ESM: to stabilize
the bond market sufficiently to relieve pressure on the distressed
States.124 The ECB press release about the OMT alone
accomplished this feat, without any actual monetary actions
being necessary.125 However, from the point of view of the BVG,
the question in the OMT case was whether Germany was
allowed to participate in such a program given that the
parliamentary controls necessary for its participation in the
similar ESM were entirely lacking in the OMT scheme.126
Surprisingly, the BVG broke new ground in OMT—it
submitted the first preliminary reference127 in its history to the
120. See
BVERFG, Jan. 14, 2014, 2 BvR 2728/13 (Ger.),
http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/EN/201
4/01/ rs20140114_2bvr272813en.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2015) [hereinafter
OMT].
121. See id.
122. See Mayer, supra note 23, at 113.
123. See id.; Petersen, supra note 30, at 321.
124. See Mayer, supra note 23, at 113.
125. See id.
126. See id. at 113–14; see also Petersen, supra note 30, at 321–22
(discussing how the BVG “[i]nitiated a preliminary reference procedure before
the European Court of Justice for the first time ever.”).
127. Consolidated EU Treaty art. 267, supra note 24 (identifying a
preliminary reference as the procedure by which a national court may ask the
ECJ to give a ruling on the “interpretation of the Treaties” or on the “validity
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ECJ as to the OMT program and its compatibility with the
European treaties.128 Considering that the Honeywell standard
requires that the ECJ be given first pass at ruling on the validity
of any potential ultra vires EU action, the BVG’s preliminary
reference as to the legality of the ECB’s actions was necessary.129
It is important to note, however, that the BVG did not refer any
questions concerning possible conflicts with the constitutional
identity of Germany; in fact, it hinted rather strongly that
identity review would not require a prior ruling by the ECJ.130
Even more interesting, though, is that instead of waiting for the
ECJ to definitively answer its ultra vires questions, the BVG
presented an extensive, preliminary answer of its own.131
The BVG opined fairly strongly that the OMT program was
an ultra vires act and would be inapplicable in Germany.132 In
other words, instead of taking the path of least resistance and
deferring the issue to the ECJ until it became absolutely
necessary to confront what it considered to be an ultra vires act
on the part of the EU (a course of action that would align nicely
with the Court’s historical reluctance to actually rule on the
validity of EU actions), the BVG instead went out of its way to
speak out on the merits of the issue. That it then found the EU
act to be ultra vires was perhaps even more shocking. Of course,
the BVG did not legally hold the OMT to be ultra vires in the
decision. Rather, it stated that it considered the OMT to be
invalid under its present interpretation of EU law, but left open
whether the ECJ’s interpretation of that law or the OMT itself
and interpretation of acts of the institutions, bodies, offices or agencies of the
Union.”).
128. E.g., OMT; Mayer, supra note 23, at 112.
129. See Mayer, supra note 23, at 118–19; see also Asteris Pliakos & Georgios
Anagnostaras, Blind Date Between Familiar Strangers: The German
Constitutional Court Goes Luxembourg!, 15 GER. L.J. 369, 373 (2014)
[hereinafter Pliakos]; see also Karsten Schneider, Questions and Answers:
Karlsruhe’s Referral for a Preliminary Ruling to the Court of Justice of the
European Union, 15 GER. L.J. 217, 225–26 (2014) (“Therefore, Karlsruhe’s
referral for a preliminary ruling to the ECJ from Jan. 14, 2014 comes as no real
surprise . . . . it has been very clear since the Lisbon and Honeywell decisions
that there would be referrals ‘prior to the acceptance of an ultra vires act’ . . . .”).
130. See OMT, supra note 128, § 102–03; see also Mayer, supra note 23, at
132–33 (“Here, the majority judges’ misunderstanding of the function of the
concept of ‘constitutional identity’ becomes manifest: They clearly do not accept
that in the national constitutional identity context, a preliminary reference to
the ECJ would be necessary in order to make sure that the legal argument in
question falls under Article 4 (2) TEU.”).
131. See OMT, supra note 128, §§ 55–100.
132. See id.
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might in some way save the validity of the program.133
In its extensive discussion of the issue, however, the BVG
provided a small glimpse into the actual workings of ultra vires
review according to the Honeywell standard. Far from being
impossible to reach, OMT offers evidence that the ‘manifest’
standard depends largely on the clear textual commitment of
powers within the EU Treaty. For instance, when discussing
whether the ECB’s actions would be manifest, the BVG placed
great emphasis on the fact that such actions would affect the
economic policy of the Member States, the responsibility for
which “lies clearly with the Member States.”134 Likewise, the
BVG invoked the idea of a clear demarcation of powers later
when noting that the OMT would potentially violate an “explicit
prohibition of monetary financing of the budget.”135 Thus, a
manifest violation can arise where the EU acts in areas that are
clearly or explicitly within the domain of the Member States.
Furthermore, OMT sheds light on a potential realignment
of competences as well. In the decision, the BVG noted that the
ECB’s actions would be “structurally significant” because they
would “lead to a considerable redistribution between the budgets
and the taxpayers of the Member States,” areas which “belong
to the core aspects of the Member States’ economic policy
responsibilities.”136 To summarize, it would appear from OMT
that the Honeywell standard would be satisfied where an EU act
violates a core area of Member State responsibility that is clearly
demarcated as such in the EU treaties. In other words, as
evidenced by OMT itself, the Honeywell standard is neither
impossible nor perhaps even that difficult to satisfy.137
The practical accessibility of the BVG’s ultra vires standard
implied in OMT, and the BVG’s apparent willingness to use it,
may represent a significant problem going forward given the
ECJ’s recent decision on the OMT referral. In Gauweiler, while
steering clear of any consideration (or even mention) of the
BVG’s assertion of ultra vires jurisdiction, the ECJ effectively
disagreed with the BVG’s assessment as to the validity of the
OMT program, ruling instead that it was entirely within the
competence of the EU to create such a program.138
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

See id. §§ 99–100.
See id. § 39.
See id. § 43.
See id. §§ 40–41.
See Bast, supra note 23, at 178–79.
See Case C-62/14, Gauweiler et al. v. Deutscher Bundestag (E.C.J. June
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In other words, the ECJ sent the case back to the BVG for
further consideration having ignored the German court’s
concerns as to the existence of an ultra vires act, thereby
effectively fulfilling the “failure to act” component necessary
under Honeywell for the eventual invalidation of an EU law by
the BVG. Put more casually, if the preliminary referral in OMT
evidenced an unexpected desire on the part of the BVG to set the
entire system on fire by actually declaring an EU act ultra vires,
the ECJ in Gauweiler appeared completely content to drop off
matches and lighter fluid at the front door of the Federal
Constitutional Court in Karlsruhe.
F.

CONCLUSION

The evolution of the BVG’s case law with respect to the legal
relationship between Germany and the EU is one of fits and
starts, threats and accommodations. In Solange I, the BVG
introduced the concept that the ECJ’s proclaimed supremacy of
EU law over conflicting domestic norms might not be so ironclad,
holding that EU acts must give way where they violate national
fundamental rights. Moreover, the BVG stated that, despite the
ECJ’s assertion of exclusive authority to review the validity of
EU laws, national courts were entitled to consider the legality of
EU acts as well. However, the BVG never actually invalidated
an EU act on these grounds and in the intervening years, the
ECJ implemented fundamental rights norms into EU law to an
extent that the BVG eventually voluntarily set aside its
fundamental rights jurisdiction over EU acts in Solange II.
In Maastricht, though, the BVG reasserted its opinion that
EU laws did not necessarily have primacy over national norms
in holding that any EU acts outside the conferred competences
of the EU set out in the constituent treaties would be held invalid
by the BVG. This decision arose from the BVG’s viewpoint that
the Member States were the masters of the treaties and that EU
law was only supreme because the national legal systems
established it as such through their own domestic norms.
16, 2015) (not yet published) § 127, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/
document.jsf?text=&docid=165057&pageIndex=0&doclang= EN&mode=lst&
dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=159426 [hereinafter Gauweiler] (“In view of all the
foregoing considerations, the answer to the questions referred is that Articles
119 TFEU, 123(1) TFEU and 127(1) and (2) TFEU and Articles 17 to 24 of the
Protocol on the ESCB and the ECB must be interpreted as permitting the ESCB
to adopt a programme for the purchase of government bonds on secondary
markets, such as the programme announced in the press release.”).
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Following upon this conception of the EU, the BVG in Maastricht
likewise asserted that the EU was limited to those powers
conferred upon it by the EU treaties and that it therefore lacked
the exclusive authority to define its own competences
(Kompetenz-Kompetenz). Finally, the BVG itself not only
retained this authority but was obliged to police the actions of
the EU for validity. The ECJ took Maastricht in stride and
arguably became more conservative in its interpretive approach
to the competences of the EU as a result. For its part, the BVG
never invoked its ultra vires jurisdiction, thereby creating an
uneasy truce between the two judicial bodies.
Lisbon, however, marked the beginning of the next phase.
In this case, the BVG took its line of reasoning one step further,
holding that not only was the EU limited to those powers that
had been conferred upon it in the EU treaties, but that the EU
was also restricted from exercising powers that the Member
States could not have legally transferred to it under their own
national constitutions. With regard to Germany, this included
any powers that would transgress the constitutional identity of
the nation. The BVG went to great lengths to set out examples
of domestic areas that were beyond the competence of the EU.
Shortly thereafter, the BVG took the opportunity in Honeywell
to clarify the standards for a successful ultra vires review,
requiring that the ECJ be given a first pass at the issue, and that
only a “manifest transgression”139 of the “transferred
competences” that was “highly significant in the structure of
competences” between the EU and the Member States would
constitute an ultra vires act. With the pronouncement of such a
high standard, it appeared to be making the assertions of Lisbon
less practically effective. Yet, shortly thereafter, in the OMT
decision, the BVG clearly indicated that the Honeywell standard
could be met, and indeed specifically stated that it considered
the OMT program to be ultra vires, since it was an EU act that
transgressed a core area that was clearly left to the Member
States in the EU treaties. The ECJ’s decision in Gauweiler that
the OMT program was within the competence of the EU creates
a genuine conflict with the BVG as to the ultra vires issue.
IV. ANALYSIS AND PREDICTIONS
As can be seen from this recap of the BVG’s most significant
139. See Honeywell, supra note 103, §§ 55–61.
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case law, the legal relationship—from BVG’s vantage point—
between the EU and Germany has evolved considerably over
time. What remains to be considered is the current status of that
relationship—from both courts’ point of view—and where it is
currently headed. In this regard, there are several aspects that
must be examined.
A.

BASIC CONCEPTUAL DIFFERENCES

As illustrated supra, the ECJ and the BVG disagree on a
variety of significant aspects concerning the relationship
between the Member States and the EU. These differences
largely stem from a basic conceptual difference in how the BVG
and the EU view that relationship. From the ECJ’s perspective,
the EU legal system is autonomous.140 It derives from its own
sources and is independent of the Member States and their
national law.141 As such, it is “self-referential and therefore
constitutional [in] nature.”142 Given this character, its primacy
over national law is self-explanatory and exists without
reference to national legal systems.143 Furthermore, since the
EU legal system is self-referential and requires absolute
uniformity, it is the natural conclusion that a single court would
have the ultimate and exclusive ability to define and regulate
the boundaries of that system. The ECJ has claimed this role,
and with it the jurisdiction to determine the competences of the
EU as a whole (Kompetenz-Kompetenz).144 Pursuant to this
responsibility, the ECJ has become a “motor” of European
integration and has often “complemented and further developed”
the often fragmentary landscape of EU law through “dynamic”
interpretation.145 As such, from the conceptual viewpoint of the
140. See Costa v. E.N.E.L., 1964 E.C.R. 586, supra note 5.
141. See Iodice, supra note 30, at 541; see also Barents, supra note 2, at 423–
24 (“Therefore, all national authorities are obliged to apply EU law in all
situations falling within its scope, irrespective of the status, contents and form
of conflicting national rules. It does not matter whether the conflicting national
rules were adopted prior to or after the rule of EU law concerned.”).
142. Barents, supra note 2, at 431.
143. See id. at 423–24.
144. See Beck, supra note 15, at 472–73; see also Grimm, supra note 2, at
236 (“Within the European Community there is an institution whose special
task is to determine whether or not organs of the Community have violated the
Treaties—the ECJ. On the Community level, therefore, the question of
competence is clear: if the ECJ concludes that a measure meets all Treaty
requirements, then the boundary has not been violated.”).
145. Voßkuhle, supra note 2, at 182.
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ECJ, the Member States created an EU where the legal system
is both independent of, and dominant over, the national legal
systems.
The BVG’s conceptual perspective obviously differs rather
substantially. From the BVG precedent examined supra, it is
quite clear that the EU legal system is not considered to be
absolutely autonomous and independent, but rather dependent
upon the national legal systems for its authority.146 The Member
States, far from creating a self-referential and independent EU,
are the masters of the treaties and EU law only has primacy
through the voluntary assent of the national implementing
legislation, which may be removed at any time.147 As a result,
EU law is only above national law to the extent and within the
parameters considered permissible by the domestic legal
system.148 The BVG concludes that since the supremacy of EU
law is a manifestation of and is controlled by the national legal
system, that system would be allowed to provide some oversight
with respect to those laws.149 Likewise, to allow the EU itself to
have unlimited reign to determine its own competences would
render national limitations irrelevant. Thus, the BVG has held
very firmly that the ECJ does not possess KompetenzKompetenz.150 Nor has the BVG been particularly welcoming to
the concept of “dynamic interpretation,” since such liberal
interpretation might serve to extend the competence of the EU
beyond what the Member States specifically conferred in the
founding treaties.151 Consequently, from the BVG’s perspective,
146. See Cruz, supra note 58, at 392; see also Honeywell, supra note 103, § 55
(showing the BVG refers to EU law as autonomous, but in the same sentence
also affirms that it remains “dependent on assignment and empowerment in a
Treaty” of which the Member States are in complete control).
147. Maastricht, supra note 52, § 112 (“Deutschland ist einer der ‘Herren der
Verträge.’”); see also Cruz, supra note 58, at 392 (explaining how “Germany is
one of the ‘Masters of the Treaties’ and may withdraw from the EU unilaterally
at any time” and that “[c]ommunity law is not autonomous: its validity in
Germany depends upon the act of accession (the ‘order to give legal application’
or Rechtsanwendungsbefehl) and ultimately upon the German Constitution.”).
148. See Grimm, supra note 7, at 356.
149. See Mayer, supra note 65, at 14.
150. See Maastricht, supra note 52, § 123–29.
151. See id. §§ 31–32 (“Thus interpretation of such standards may not have
an effect equivalent to an extension of the Treaty; indeed, if standards of
competence were interpreted in this way, such interpretation would not have
any binding effect on Germany.”); see also Lisbon, supra note 77, § 238 (“If in
the process of European integration primary law is amended, or expansively
interpreted by institutions, a constitutionally important tension will arise with
the principle of conferral and with the individual Member State’s constitutional
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the Member States retain ultimate control over the EU and its
legal system.
Contrasting these divergent conceptual viewpoints, it can
easily be seen how the two legal systems have developed in
entirely different directions: they both view their respective legal
order to have primacy over the other and their individual
holdings reflect those beliefs. That the case law and legal norms
of the BVG and the ECJ have become so contradictory creates
an ongoing potential for conflict whenever the two legal orders
come into contact.152 Furthermore, since neither the BVG nor
the ECJ appear willing to forfeit their claim to primacy any time
in the near future, this overt disagreement will not likely go
away on its own.
Yet, until OMT and Gauweiler, the BVG and ECJ have
generally managed to avoid open battles for nearly forty years.
This, in and of itself, has been a triumph of sorts, given that the
consequences of such a public clash between the courts over the
primacy/jurisdictional question would be catastrophic to the
practical continuance of the EU.153 That such a fate has been
avoided this long owes perhaps just as much to the pragmatism
of the two courts, though, as to any fear they may harbor
concerning the magnitude of such a conflict.154
B. AGREEING TO DISAGREE
Despite their differences in opinion about the conceptual
basis of the EU, both the ECJ and the BVG have shown a
pragmatic ability to cooperate when necessary.155 Given the
intertwined nature of the EU and national legal systems, it is
not surprising that the two systems (and the courts within) exert
some influence over each other on substantive and procedural
responsibility for integration.”).
152. See Cruz, supra note 58, at 418.
153. See Mahlmann, supra note 102, at 1414; see also Mayer, supra note 23,
at 133 (“Establishing national identity and national constitutional identity as a
limit of EU law unilaterally is extremely dangerous for legal unity in the EU
and open to abuse.”); see also Bieber, supra note 77, at 405 (“How damaging
such claims for unilateral action within a united system of decision-making are,
has already been stated by the European Court of Justice . . . .”).
154. See Beck, supra note 15, at 493.
155. See Voßkuhle, supra note 2, at 189 (“[T]he relationship between the
Court of Justice and the Federal Constitutional Court is not about superiority
or subordination but about appropriately sharing and assigning responsibilities
in a complex multilevel system.”).
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issues.156 With specific reference to the BVG and the ECJ, this
back and forth influence has at times been described as a form
of judicial ‘dialogue,’ wherein the rulings of each court signal to
the other their specific intentions.157 This serves to both avoid
possible conflicts as well as pave the way to potential resolutions
where those conflicts already exist.158 This dialogue, at times,
has come to resemble a bit of a dance, with one partner
gracefully leading the other around any potential legal pitfalls
in their relationship. This can readily be seen in the cases
examined supra.
Starting with Solange I, the BVG expressed its concern
about the fundamental rights protection afforded under EU law.
It also introduced the idea that national courts could deny the
application of EU law where adequate protection was not
provided at the EU level.159 Thus alerted to the potential
problem, the ECJ reacted by ensuring the protection of
fundamental rights at the EU level.160 Its fears allayed, the BVG
responded in Solange II by voluntarily foregoing fundamental
rights jurisdiction over EU law so long as EU protections
remained sufficient.161 Arguably, a similar dynamic took place
with respect to EU competences: in Maastricht, the BVG
signaled its intent to provide oversight in this area through ultra
vires review, and subsequently, the ECJ took more care in its
interpretation of EU competences.162 The fact that the BVG
waited seventeen years before actually exercising its asserted
ultra vires jurisdiction in Honeywell, and in doing so propagated
a review standard considered virtually impossible to meet,163
might be interpreted similarly to Solange II, as a voluntary
suspension of an asserted, but controversial, jurisdiction.
This warning and response pattern (BVG jurisdictional

156. See Barents, supra note 2, at 440; Voßkuhle, supra note 2, at 181–82;
Theil, supra note 84, at 633.
157. See Kuo, supra note 37, at 363–64; Vranes, supra note 30, at 99.
158. See Kuo, supra note 37, at 363–64.
159. See Solange I, supra note 32, at 281.
160. See Kumm, supra note 4, at 294–95; Grimm, supra note 2, at 233; Beck,
supra note 15, at 489.
161. See Solange II, supra note 44, § 108.
162. See Cruz, supra note 58, at 404; Kumm, supra note 4, at 296; Voßkuhle,
supra note 2, at 195.
163. See Möllers, supra note 106, at 166; see also Honeywell, supra note 103,
§§ 95, 104 (Landau, J., dissenting) (arguing that the BVG majority creates
“excessive requirements on the finding of an ultra vires act,” and therefore only
creates an ultra vires review that exists “on paper” but not in reality).
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assertion–ECJ adjustment–BVG jurisdictional suspension) can
largely be seen as a form of deference each court has shown the
other as well as a general hesitance to provoke a conflict.164 For
its part, the ECJ has mostly addressed the actual concerns with
the EU put forward by the BVG while studiously ignoring the
assertions of jurisdictional oversight those concerns have
produced. By taking care of the underlying problems identified
by the BVG, the ECJ has successfully eliminated any necessity
for the BVG to actually exercise its proclaimed jurisdiction.
Finding its main concerns resolved, the BVG has dutifully
abstained from actually using its proposed EU oversight
capabilities, even where it has had an opportunity to do so.165
While not solving the principles of the jurisdictional conflict, this
pattern has successfully avoided any practical ramifications that
conflict might create. In short, both courts have seemingly gone
out of their way to avoid the conceptual disagreement and the
jurisdictional issue that it has provoked. They have, in basic
terms, up until now agreed to disagree.
C. CHANGING PATTERNS?
It is arguable, however, that the OMT/Gauweiler decisions
represent a significant shift away from conflict avoidance and
towards a declaration of war.166 With respect to the BVG, there
are several arguments that support this theory. First, unlike the
prior cases in which the BVG threatened to consider an ultra
vires complaint if circumstances lined up properly, in OMT the
BVG officially opined that an EU act was actually ultra vires.
Therefore, OMT is less a warning of an ultra vires finding and
more a promise of one unless the ECJ intervenes.167 As such, it
represents a deviation from the BVG’s established pattern.
Second, while the BVG and the ECJ had previously worked hard
164. See Beck, supra note 15, at 486, 489, 493.
165. See Möllers, supra note 106, at 161 (noting that the BVG deliberately
missed an opportunity to exercise its jurisdiction in the Bananas Case); see also
Data Protection Case, supra note 51 (abstaining from addressing the validity of
the EU Directive, the BVG ruled on the unconstitutionality of the German
legislation implementing the EU Data Protection Directive instead).
166. See Alexander Thiele, Friendly or Unfriendly Act? The “Historic”
Referral of the Constitutional Court to the ECJ Regarding the ECB’s OMT
Program, 15 GER. L.J. 241, 247–48 (2014) (focusing on whether the referral by
the BVG of the OMT question to the ECJ was intended as an “act of friendliness”
or as a hostile first step towards an “open conflict.”).
167. See Pliakos, supra note 129, at 375–76.
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to avoid potential conflicts through dialogue,168 the OMT referral
appeared to invite such a confrontation between the two courts.
The BVG could have simply referred the validity of the EU act
to the ECJ for its consideration without any discussion of the
substantive law; instead, it chose to pre-answer its own question
as to the legitimacy of the OMT program.169 In doing so, it
virtually invented a novel referral mechanism through which it
could issue the ECJ with its promise to invalidate the act.170 This
action stands in direct contrast to the impression given by the
Honeywell standard that an ultra vires holding was a remedy of
“last resort.”171 Instead, the BVG in OMT appeared to be
aggressively pursuing such a finding, which is inconsistent with
its prior strategy of warnings and confrontation avoidance.
On the other hand, it is also quite possible to interpret the
OMT referral as a simple continuation of the BVG’s prior
warning and response pattern used to avert a potentially
catastrophic disagreement between the BVG and the ECJ.
Viewed in this light, the promise of an ultra vires holding with
respect to the OMT program was nothing more than a simple
notification to the ECJ as to how the BVG views the case. By
clarifying its views beforehand, the BVG was not necessarily
threatening the ECJ, but rather seeking to involve the ECJ in
an extremely important decision that may very well affect the
fate of the EU itself.172 It is also important to realize that, once
the BVG believed that the EU act was actually ultra vires, it had
little choice but to express its opinion to the ECJ alongside the
referral. To have simply sent a plain referral would have left the
ECJ blind as to the potential dangers (with respect to a
disagreement with the BVG) inherent in their decision. In this
manner, the BVG’s pre-answer served the same exact purpose
as the earlier threats to invoke oversight jurisdiction that
Solange I and Maastricht did—it made the ECJ aware of a
problem with the EU that needed to be fixed. Lesser measures
would not have been able to serve the same informational
purpose; thus the pre-answer, far from being a confrontational
device or an escalation, may have helped to avoid a possible

168. See Beck, supra note 15, at 489.
169. See Mayer, supra note 23, at 114; Thomas Beukers, The
Bundesverfassungsgericht Preliminary Reference on the OMT Program: “In the
ECB We Do Not Trust. What About You?”, 15 GER. L.J. 343–44 (2014).
170. See Beukers, supra note 169, at 344.
171. Mahlmann, supra note 102, at 1415.
172. See Petersen, supra note 30, at 326.
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conflict.
A similar technique can arguably be seen in the Lisbon
decision as well. After introducing the possibility of identity
review, the BVG went to great lengths to spell out those areas
that would be considered part of Germany’s constitutional
identity and therefore off-limits to the EU.173 While many critics
have derided the list as being “difficult to reconcile with the
present level of integration,”174 a “simple compilation and
protection of remaining national powers,”175 “arbitrary,” and
“theoretically unfounded,”176 these critiques miss the practical
impact of the list. It serves as a warning to the EU and the ECJ
that these areas are not eligible for further integration.
Specifically defining these areas beforehand lessens the
likelihood that the EU will exercise its authority in a manner
that would require the BVG to actually use its asserted identity
review jurisdiction.177 Thus, the list is not meant only as an
actual description of what constitutes the German identity, but
rather is also intended as another mechanism through which the
BVG can avoid confrontation with the ECJ over jurisdictional
issues. As such, taking a wider view of the warning and response
pattern of dialogue, not only does the OMT reference fit within
the BVG’s prior practice, but the Lisbon identity assertion (and
definition) as well.
The ECJ’s decision in Gauweiler, by contrast, is difficult to
view as a continuation of the aforementioned pattern. Rather
than avoiding a potential conflict with the BVG over the legality
of the OMT program, the ECJ appears to have invited such a
confrontation, even though it possessed numerous other options
that would have deescalated the situation. For example, it could
have followed the BVG’s lead and declared the OMT program to
be ultra vires.178 Likewise, the ECJ could have interpreted the
OMT program in the highly restrictive non-ultra vires manner
suggested by the BVG in OMT, thereby keeping it within the
competences of the EU.179 In both instances, the ECJ, by
following the BVG’s lead as expressed in its referral decision,
would have eliminated any grounds for conflict over the issue.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

See Lisbon, supra note 77, §§ 252–53.
Theil, supra note 84, at 610.
Thym, supra note 31, at 1801.
Murkens, supra note 85, at 522.
See Schorkopf Lisbon, supra note 75, at 264.
See Mayer, supra note 23, at 145.
See id. at 120; Beukers, supra note 169, at 367.
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Another alternative would have been to simply stall for
time—the ECJ takes an average of nearly seventeen months to
answer a preliminary reference180 and has no external, internal,
or legal procedural requirement in normal cases to do so
expeditiously.181 The BVG, for its part, requested neither an
accelerated timetable for the case nor that interim measures be
taken with respect to the OMT program during the ECJ’s
consideration of the referral.182 As such, the ECJ could have
simply waited until the EU economies bolstered by the OMT
program recovered enough to stand alone and thereafter ruled
the program invalid. This would have allowed the ECJ to avoid
open conflict with the BVG while still preserving the practical
and arguably necessary benefits of the OMT program. Such an
action,
though
perhaps
controversial
and
even
counterproductive,183 would have corresponded directly with the
warning and response pattern exhibited by the courts in
previous conflicts.
The ECJ did not avail itself of any of these conflict avoidance
options; it chose instead to press forward with its ruling and
uphold the OMT program in the face of the BVG’s apparent
disagreement. At its worst, such an outcome might be considered
as an outright declaration of war on the BVG. Yet, approached
from a different angle, Gauweiler might simply be characterized
as a turning of the tables: the ECJ has gone from adjusting its
jurisprudence in response to BVG warnings to instead issuing
its own warning to the BVG. In this light, Gauweiler may be
taken as notice that the ECJ will not simply stand aside while
the German court attempts to restrict the competence of the EU.
At its best, this decision represents a simple change in lead,
whereby the ECJ seeks to navigate the BVG through the legal
pitfalls of the OMT situation according to its own interpretation
of EU law, rather than following the BVG’s directions from
OMT.
180. See Mayer, supra note 23, at 121.
181. See Consolidated EU Treaty, supra note 24, at art. 19; Title III—
References for a Preliminary Ruling—Consolidated Version of the Rules of
Procedure of the Court of Justice of 25 September 2012, 2012 O.J. (L 265) 1,
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=OJ:L:2012:265:
FULL&from=EN (last visited Feb. 12, 2015).
182. See Mayer, supra note 23, at 123.
183. See Beukers, supra note 169, at 364 (arguing that the restrictions
already placed upon German participation in the OMT program render it less
effective in the meantime and that an expedited review might be more
beneficial).
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D. PEERING INTO THE SHORT-TERM FUTURE
Of course, such changes in lead only work where the party
previously in the lead is willing to take on a deferential role. In
this respect, the responsibility for avoiding a foundational crisis
now appears to be entirely in the hands of the BVG. In the past,
the ECJ has proven that it was prepared to adjust its
jurisprudence to avoid potential conflicts. The question becomes
whether the BVG is now willing to do the same. If it is, then a
confrontation over the OMT program may be avoided. This
would require the BVG repudiating or rethinking its pre-answer
and following the ECJ’s reasoning instead.184 Such a result
would provide some evidence as to the relative interest both
courts have in asserting their conceptual principles and further
strengthen the view that neither court is particularly interested
in fomenting a foundational crisis in the EU.
Nevertheless, after Gauweiler, the chances of a potentially
catastrophic confrontation appear to have increased
significantly. If the BVG chooses to abide by its pre-answer
reasoning and finds the OMT program to be ultra vires, a
legitimate foundational crisis might occur.185 Even if the BVG
reverses course and adheres to the ECJ’s reasoning on the ultra
vires aspect of the OMT program, it could still instigate a crisis
by ruling that the program infringes upon Germany’s
constitutional identity (an option that it specifically left open
pending the ECJ’s handling of the preliminary reference).186 The
creation of such an impasse might not be solvable through the
established legal mechanisms, but would likely require a
political intervention instead.187
Of course, speculation as to the ultimate impact and
importance of the OMT/Gauweiler decisions is rather limited in
its utility, especially considering that the litigation is still
ongoing. What can be said definitively at this point, is that
regardless of the eventual outcome, the OMT/Gauweiler
litigation will shed some much-needed light on the legal
relationship between Germany and the EU. In this respect, it
will have helped clarify not only the BVG’s position, but the
ECJ’s as well.
184. See Mayer, supra note 23, at 145; Petersen, supra note 30, at 326–27.
185. See Beukers, supra note 169, at 365; Mayer, supra note 23, at 124;
Pliakos, supra note 129, at 378–79.
186. See OMT, supra note 128, ¶ 102; Mayer, supra note 23, at 131–32.
187. See Grimm, supra note 2, at 236.
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E. PEERING INTO THE LONG-TERM FUTURE
Even if the current OMT/Gauweiler litigation is resolved
without further incident, there still remains “a potential for
conflict embedded in the system” that arguably muddies the
long-term prospects of the EU.188 Assuming that any
OMT/Gauweiler resolution results in neither the ECJ nor the
BVG overtly backing down from their present jurisdictional
principles, both courts will retain the potential to incite another
jurisdictional clash going forward. Additionally, other national
constitutional courts also claim the power to “set aside EU [l]aw
on constitutional grounds under certain circumstances”189 and
thus also have the ability to provoke a crisis. Further, the
influential stature of the BVG190 likely invites more Member
State constitutional courts to follow its lead and assert similar
or identical oversight jurisdictions.191 The existence of several
Member State constitutional courts exercising such review
doctrines not only multiplies the probability that such a court
would openly incite (or even stumble into) a foundational crisis,
but the increased acceptability of these jurisdictional doctrines
(and the hazard they pose to the EU) may provoke the ECJ itself
to step in and attempt to halt their spread, thereby creating its
own conflict. Indeed, the BVG itself has recognized the danger
to the EU inherent in every Member State exercising ultra vires
jurisdiction; this was one of the reasons for the near
impossibility of the Honeywell standard.192
In addition to a considerable number of institutional
candidates capable of provoking a crisis, there are also a
substantial number of substantive areas from which such a
crisis might arise. While it is true that certain areas of EU law
are less likely than others to create a conflict over EU
188. Cruz, supra note 58, at 418 (stating also that real conflicts have been
avoided due to prudence and pragmatism).
189. Kumm, supra note 4, at 263.
190. Peter E. Quint, “The Most Extraordinarily Powerful Court of Law the
World Has Ever Known”?—Judicial Review in the United States and Germany,
65 MD. L. REV. 152, 153 (2006).
191. See Pliakos, supra note 129, at 374 (“It is indeed well known that the
judicial pronouncements of the [BVG] inspire the case law of other
constitutional courts, especially as concerns the existence of ultra vires acts.”).
192. See Honeywell, supra note 103, § 57 (“If each Member State claimed to
be able to decide through their own courts on the validity of legal acts of the
Union, the primacy of application could be circumvented in practice, and the
uniform application of Union law would be placed at risk.”); see also Mahlmann,
supra note 102, at 1410.
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competences, the ambiguity of the EU treaty is such that there
will “always be a blurred zone at the points of intersection
between the powers of the Member States and the Union.”193
Thus, debate concerning the conferred powers may always serve
as a possible source of foundational conflict, as might the
ongoing dispute over the ECJ’s claim to an exclusive right to
interpret the extent of its own competences under those powers
(Kompetenz-Kompetenz).194
Also, national constitutional identity, as introduced in
Lisbon, is fertile ground for future disagreement,195 especially
given the expansive list of German identity areas presented as
exempt from integration by the BVG in Lisbon. If it is a given
that the EU exhibits a “tendency of political selfenhancement”196 and that the ECJ, as the “motor of
integration,”197 enables this through its dynamic interpretation
of the treaties, then it is highly probable that the dynamically
developing competences of the EU will eventually transgress
upon the forbidden areas of German identity. In this context as
well, an increasing acceptance of oversight jurisdiction by
Member State constitutional courts may spell disaster because
constitutional identity is specific to each Member State.198 Thus,
the outlines of “off-limit” areas around which the EU must
maneuver will vary from Member State to Member State, likely
increasing the odds that an accidental transgression into an
identity area in at least one State will ultimately occur.
Also, there will always be individuals or political actors in
every Member State with a vested interest in challenging the
authority or legitimacy of the EU in order to undermine its
effectiveness. Evidence of this can be seen not only in the media
headlines surrounding the negotiation of any new EU treaty or
the ultimate unpopularity of the rejected Constitutional
Treaty,199 but also in the fact that both the Maastricht200 and
193. Beck, supra note 15, at 484.
194. See id. at 480.
195. See Thym, supra note 31, at 1805.
196. Lisbon, supra note 77, § 237; see also Grimm, supra note 7, at 361.
197. Voßkuhle, supra note 2, at 182.
198. See Thym, supra note 31, at 1806.
199. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
200. E.g., Maastricht, supra note 52 (Ger.); Constitutional Council [CC], Apr.
9, 1992, 92-308 DC, Maastricht I, (Fr.), in THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW AND NATIONAL LAW: THE CASES: VOLUME 1, at 385
(Andrew Oppenheimer ed., Cambridge University Press 1994); Constitutional
Council [CC], Apr. 9, 1992, 92-312 DC. Maastricht II, (Fr.), in THE
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Lisbon201 treaties were challenged in several Member State
constitutional courts. The wide range of legal issues on which
such individuals can attack EU actions in national courts means
that there will be an ever-present supply of opportunities for the
Member State constitutional courts that have embraced EU
oversight doctrines similar to those found in Germany, to
exercise their jurisdiction and potentially provoke a
foundational crisis. In short, there exists abundant legal
grounds from which a potentially catastrophic case can arise,
numerous Member State courts willing to exercise jurisdiction
over such cases, and a sufficient number of individuals willing
to bring these issues to the attention of those courts. Given these
circumstances, it would hardly be surprising if a foundational
crisis in the EU were to occur.
V. CONCLUSORY REMARKS
The legal relationship between Germany and the EU
personifies a more general conceptual difference between how
the EU views itself and how the Member States view it. In the
context of Germany, the end result is a divergence in legal
doctrines with respect to the relative jurisdictional abilities of
the BVG and the ECJ: each believes that their respective legal
system ultimately has primacy over the other and retains the
jurisdiction to enforce that primacy. That the BVG and ECJ have
managed to co-exist for over four decades while substantively
disagreeing as to which one reigns supreme is a testament to
their conflict avoidance skills and pragmatism.202 As a former
U.S. Attorney General once noted, “if necessity is the mother of

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN COMMUNITY LAW AND NATIONAL LAW: THE CASES:
VOLUME 1, at 399 (Andrew Oppenheimer ed., Cambridge University Press
1994); Denmark Supreme Court, Apr. 6, 1998, I-361/1997, Carlsen and Others
v. Rasmussen, in THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN COMMUNITY LAW AND
NATIONAL LAW: THE CASES: VOLUME 2, at 174 (Andrew Oppenheimer ed.,
Cambridge University Press 2003) (Den.).
201. E.g., Lisbon, supra note 77 (Ger.); Ústavní soud České republiky ze dne
26.11.2008 (ÚS) [Judgment of the Constitutional Court of Nov. 26, 2008, Treaty
of Lisbon I], Pl. ÚS 19/08 (Czech), http://www.usoud.cz/en/decisions/
?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=484 (last visited Feb. 12 2015); Ústavní soud
České republiky ze dne 3.11.2009 (ÚS) [Judgment of the Constitutional Court
of Nov. 3, 2009, Treaty of Lisbon II], Pl. ÚS 29/09 (Czech),
http://www.usoud.cz/en/decisions/ ?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=466&cHash=
eedba7ca14d226b879ccaf91a6dcb276 (last visited Feb. 12, 2015).
202. See Beck, supra note 15, at 493; Cruz, supra note 58, at 418.
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invention, it’s the father of cooperation,”203 and the potentially
catastrophic results that would follow a concrete disagreement
between the two courts over issues of EU competence or
constitutional court jurisdiction over those competences have
long since necessitated intensive cooperation between the BVG
and ECJ.
However, relying on this cooperation to avert a potential
foundational crisis in the EU is a fairly dangerous strategy,
regardless of its sustained historical success. For one thing, as
U.S. Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer has mentioned, the
successful avoidance of inter-court conflicts is often “judge
specific; it may, or may not, continue to exist over time.”204 Thus,
as the members of the BVG and ECJ change with time, the
ability or interest of both courts in avoiding a conflict may wax
and wane. Moreover, while the BVG and ECJ case law examined
above provides numerous examples where both courts have
worked well in the past to avoid such a disastrous conflict, those
same cases offer ample evidence that both courts have been
slowly inching closer and closer to a collision. The looming
conflict is a bit like nightfall: it may not have arrived yet, but
that does not mean it is not coming. Indeed, with the escalation
of the OMT/Gauweiler litigation, it may already be present.
In fact, even if the OMT/Gauweiler situation is resolved
without a major confrontation, it is very difficult to imagine that
a crisis will not eventually arrive. The ECJ cannot allow the
Member State constitutional courts to actually exercise
oversight with respect to the EU competences and declare EU
acts invalid, for to do so would ultimately undermine the
uniformity of EU law205 and destroy the legal basis of the EU.206
On the other hand, the BVG is not likely to disavow the legal
principles that it has developed over the past forty years, and
likely could not do so without significantly losing face at both the
national and European levels. Thus, the disagreement will
persist, and any attempt by either court to actually settle the
discrepancy in its favor may precipitate the very conflict that

203. Interview by Larry King with John Ashcroft, Attorney General, CNN
LARRY KING LIVE (May 31, 2002), http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/
0205/31/lkl.00.html (last visited Feb. 12 2015).
204. Stephen Breyer, Changing Relationships Among European
Constitutional Courts, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 1045, 1056 (2000).
205. See Honeywell, supra note 103, § 57.
206. See Costa v. E.N.E.L., 1964 E.C.R. 586, 594.
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both courts have actively been trying to avoid.207 Consequently,
since neither side is likely to voluntarily alter its stance on the
issue, and neither can end the disagreement in any other way,
the best that can be hoped for is continued avoidance of the issue
by both sides. While not exactly a comforting result, it is clearly
better than the alternatives. And, as the BVG and ECJ case law
discussed above shows, it is the approach historically taken by
both sides in this regard. Whether the OMT/Gauweiler litigation
represents a continuation of this avoidance pattern or a
renewed, enlarged willingness on the part of the BVG to assert
its jurisdiction remains to be seen. Regardless, the BVG’s
anticipated reaction to the Gauweiler decision and the eventual
resolution of the overall case, will go some way towards further
clarifying the legal relationship between Germany and the EU.

207. See Barents, supra note 2, at 440.

